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I INTRODUCTION 
The recent change to the law of exclusion relating to evidence obtained 
through a breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights by R v Shaheei is a 
substantial departure from New Zealand Bill of Right's Jaw. While it is a 
significant change, the decision closely foJiows that made by the Privy Council 
in Mohammed v The State,2 and the change had been hinted at by the Court of 
Appeal five years earlier in R v Grayson and Taylor. 3 There are always going 
to be problems in protecting the rights of the individual in the face of public 
expectations of justice, and as such the topic of exclusion of evidence is going 
to be contentious. However, as this essay will show, by discarding the prima 
facie rule of exclusion in favour of an exercise that balances the interests of the 
individual with the interests of the public, the Court of Appeal has unearthed a 
new set of problems. 
In Part III of this essay, the development of the prima facie rule of exclusion 
will be examined by analysing New Zealand ' s position on admissibility at 
common law and after the introduction of the Bill of Rights. This analysis will 
show that despite early support for the prima facie rule, there has been 
growing dissatisfaction with its application, resulting in judicial attempts to 
circumvent the rule. 
1 R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA). 
2 Mohammed v The State [1999] 2 AC 111 (PC). 
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Part IV will analyse comparable jurisdictions in light of New Zealand's stance, 
and will examine the approach that was taken by the Court of Appeal towards 
this international jurisprudence. This section will illustrate that New Zealand's 
prima facie rule of exclusion was moderate when compared with other 
countries, but that the decision in Shaheed was motivated by the Court of 
Appeal's wish to follow the recent approach taken by the Privy Council. Also 
notable is the lack of analysis given to South Africa's position, which would 
be very useful, given the recent debate in the country prior to the adoption of a 
qualified exclusionary rule in their new Constitution. 
The rationale behind the decision of the Court of Appeal, the impact that the 
decision will have on the ability to provide effective remedies to individuals, 
and the likelihood of a diminishment of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights will be discussed in Part V. This analysis will critique the reasoning of 
the majority in light of earlier judgements, foreign jurisprudence, international 
obligations, and the need to uphold the principle of equality before the law. 
This essay will show that the intention of the Court of Appeal to allow judges 
to take into account public interest when deciding on the admissibility of 
evidence will not only create numerous problems for the Court later, but that it 
will lessen the effect of the Bill of Rights as a protector of individual rights. 
II R v SHAHEED 
3 R v Grayson and Taylor [ 1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA). 
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A The Facts 
The Court of Appeal in Shaheed was asked to consider whether DNA evidence 
linking a man to the sexual violation of a 14-year-old girl, was admissible 
because it derived from an earlier unlawful DNA sample. The Crown admitted 
that the police breached section 21 of the Bill of Rights by deceiving the 
accused into providing a DNA sample after an earlier offence. The Solicitor-
General argued that New Zealand's prima facie rule of exclusion for evidence 
resulting from a breach was too strict and submitted that the remedy to the 
accused should not be disproportionate to the breach.4 Defence counsel 
submitted that the prima facie rule was workable and that the greater good of 
the public was served by upholding individual rights. 5 
B The Decision 
After espousing the need for remedies to be proportionate to the breach, and a 
review of comparable jurisdictions, the prima facie rule of exclusion was 
discarded and replaced with a balancing exercise, by a majority of 6-1.6 Once a 
breach of the Bill of Rights has been established, the new balancing exercise is 
to take into account factors such as proportionality, the need for an effective 
justice system, whether the breach was deliberate, whether other investigative 
4 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 394. 
5 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 395. 
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techniques were available, the nature of the evidence, the centrality of the 
evidence, and the seriousness of the offence.7 The breach of the Bill of Rights 
will be relegated to a factor that is to be given "significant weight"8 in 
determining whether evidence should be excluded. The balancing exercise 
effectively gives judges a discretion to admit evidence depending on the 
circumstances of each case. 
III DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIMA FACIE RULE OF 
EXCLUSION 
A Position at Common Law 
The position in New Zealand at common law was stated in R v Coombs9 where 
it was held that improperly or unlawfully obtained evidence was admissible in 
court, subject to the need to prevent an abuse of process and an unfair trial. 
The common law was heavily in favour of admission of evidence, and the 
discretion of judges involved a balancing of interests. This discretion was 
described by Eichelbaum CJ in R v Dally as requiring "the weighing of 
competing requirements of public interest; on the one hand the need to bring to 
conviction those who commit criminal offences, on the other the public 
interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair 
6 Despite the adoption of a balancing test the DNA evidence was excluded by a majority of 4-
3. By a majority of 4-3 the Court held that the victim' s identification of the accused was 
admissible. The accused was subsequently convicted at trial. 
7 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 387 per Blanchard J. 
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treatment." 10 Evidence can still be excluded under this common Jaw principle 
as well as under the Bill of Rights. 11 
B Relationship to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
The introduction of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirmed New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights , but provided no explicit consequences for a breach of rights. The 
question of remedying a breach was first considered in R v Kirifi 12 where the 
Court found that there had been a breach of the right to a lawyer under section 
23(1)(b). Cooke P simply stated, "once a breach of s23 (1)(b) has been 
established, the trial Judge acts rightly in ruling out a consequent admission 
unless there are circumstances in the particul ar case satisfying him or her that 
it is fair and right to allow the admission into evidence." 13 This stance led to 
what has become known as the prima facie rule of exclusion. In R v Butcher 
and Burgess the rule was further expressed as meaning that evidence obtained 
through a breach of the Bill of Rights would be prima facie excluded, subject 
to various Crown arguments that may lead to the Court exercising its 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 14 
8 R v Shaheed, above n l , 387 per Blanchard J. 
9 R v Coombs [ 1985] l NZLR 318 (CA). 
10 R v Dally [ 1990) 2 NZLR 184, 192 (CA) per E ichelbaum CJ. 
11 R v La11galis, (1993) l HRNZ466, 474 (CA). 
12 R v Kirifi (1992) 2 NZLR 8 (CA). 
13 R v Kirifi above n 12, 12 per Cooke P. 
14 R v Butcher and Burgess [ 1992] 2 NZLR 257 , 266 (CA) per Cooke P. 
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The prima facie rule of exclusion placed the onus on the prosecution to satisfy 
the Court that despite a breach of the Bill of Rights it is "fair and right" to 
admit the evidence. 15 In determining whether it is fair and right that the 
evidence be admitted it is necessary to weigh up several factors. In the eyes of 
Cooke P in R v Goodwin the factors that can displace the presumption of 
exclusion are non-exhaustively defined as including waiver of the rights 
concerned, triviality of the breach, the need for urgency in obtaining the 
evidence, physical danger to police officers, and inconsequentiality of the 
breach. 16 Since the emergence of the rule the prima facie rule has been 
extended to apply to evidence obtained through unreasonable search and 
seizure, 17 arbitrary detention , 18 a breach of the rights of an arrested or detained 
person, 19 and a breach of the rights of a person charged with an offence.20 
In Goodwin the Court of Appeal unanimously rejected arguments for replacing 
the prim facie rule with a balancing exercise.2 1 The Court, which included 
Richardson P and Gault J from Shaheed indicated that once a breach was 
established, the onus for proving admission of the evidence should be on the 
Crown, and that evidence must be excluded unless there is good reason to the 
contrary.22 
15 James Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams 011 Criminal Law, (2"d student edition, Brookers, 
Wellington, 1998) 966. 
16 R v Goodwill [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 171 (CA) per Cooke P. 
17 R v Jefferies [ 1994] l NZLR 290 (CA). 
18 R v Goodwin (No. 2) [1993] 2 NZLR 390 (CA). 
19 R v Te Kira (1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
20 R v Dollaldson [1995] 3 NZLR 641 (CA). 
21 R v Goodwin above n 16, 154. 
22 R v Goodwill above n 16, 202. 
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Although the Bill of Rights has no provision allowing exclusion of evidence, 
great weight is placed on the fact that the legislature saw fit to affirm 
fundamental rights.23 Cooke P believed the prima facie rule to be the best 
method of upholding the rights as "it would be inconsistent with the concept of 
the Bill of Rights to relegate them [the rights] to be matters to be given some 
weight in the exercise of judicial discretion".24 In her dissenting judgement in 
Shaheed, Elias CJ cites similar reasons: 25 
the presumption to exclude unless there is good reason to admit evidence 
obtained in breach of rights implements a balance struck by the Bill of 
Rights Act between minimum standards of criminal process and the public 
interest in the detection and prosecution of crime. 
As evident from these statements, both these Judges believed that the prima 
facie rule of exclusion was the most suitable method for New Zealand 
circumstances. 
However, support for the pnma facie rule has been declining amongst the 
judiciary. In R v Butcher and Burgess, Gault J diverged from full support of 
the prima facie rule when he stated that there was a need to ensure that each 
remedy should be appropriate to the breach.26 Likewise, the dissenting 
judgement of Thomas J in R v Te Kira also signalled judicial dissatisfaction 
23 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 385 per Elias CJ dissenting. 
24 R v Te Kira above n 19, 262 per Cooke P . 
25 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 386, per Elias CJ dissenting . 
26 R v Butcher and Burgess above n 14, 272 per Gault J . 
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with the prima facie rule.27 Thomas J believed that the prima facie rule was an 
unnecessary response to a breach of section 23(3) of the right to be brought 
before a court as soon as possible.28 While indicating his preference for a 
balancing approach where the right in question may be outweighed by public 
interest, he also stated that the prima facie rule may be an appropriate remedy 
for a breach of the right to consult a lawyer under of section 23(1)(b).29 
Thomas J emphasised that although the prima facie rule may uphold the 
affirmed right, "it is likely to do so at the expense of a proper balancing of 
those factors which bear on the public interest."30 
As evidenced in Shaheed, there has been mounting concern that New Zealand 
had effectively adopted a rule of automatic exclusion for tainted evidence. 31 
Despite judges stressing that the prima facie rule of exclusion was not the 
same as automatic exclusion32 it is apparent that the judicial frustration with 
the prima facie rule stemmed from the belief that the prima facie rule was 
being applied too rigidly. 33 
C Circumventing the Prima Facie Rule of Exclusion 
27 R v Te Kira above n 19, 285-286 per Thomas J dissenting. 
28 R v Te Kira above n l9, 279 per Thomas J dissenting. 
29 R v Te Kira above n 19,287 per Thomas J dissenting. 
30 R v Te Kira above n 19,286 per Thomas J dissenting. 
31 R v Shaheed, above n 1,413, per Blanchard J. 
32 R v Goodwin above n 16,206, per Gault J. 
33 R v Shaheed, above n 1,413, per Blanchard J. 
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The approach of the Courts to determining reasonableness under section 21 
has been very important to the development of the prima facie rule. As the 
issue of a remedy is not relevant until a breach has been determined, the 
interpretation of "unreasonable" gives a good indication of judicial 
dissatisfaction with the rule. Where there appeared to be public interest in 
allowing the admission of evidence, judges seemed to be reluctant to find that 
there had been a breach. Increasingly decisions were being made on the basis 
that police conduct was found not to breach the Bill of Rights as the Court of 
Appeal "move[d] the goal posts."34 
In Grayson and Taylor the Court was asked to consider whether police 
conduct was unreasonable under section 21. After conceding that they did not 
have enough information to gain a search warrant, the police illegally entered 
the property of suspected drug-dealers to confirm suspicions that they were 
cultivating cannabis.35 The Court of Appeal found that there was no 
unreasonable search under section 21 of the Bill of Rights and admitted the 
resulting evidence. Despite labelling the police actions illegal they stated, "this 
particular infringement. .. is not in the circumstances we have detailed of such 
seriousness as to call for condemnation as being unreasonable."36 The 
condemnation referred to is inextricably linked to the knowledge that such a 
finding would likely result in the incriminating evidence being excluded. In 
34 Hart Schwartz "The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act" (1998) NZ Law Rev 259,262. 
35 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n 3, 409. 
36 R v Grayson and Taylor, above n 3,410. 
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the same decision the Court of Appeal indicated that it would be prepared to 
look at the appropriateness of the prima facie rule for New Zealand.37 The 
circumvention of the prima facie rule that is apparent in this case is a prime 
example that the Court of Appeal felt that the rule did not grant enough 
judicial discretion to admit evidence that is obtained through a breach of the 
Bill of Rights. 
IV POSITION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
A Privy Council Decision in Mohammed v The State 
The rationale behind discarding the prima facie rule in favour of a balancing 
exercise stems from the recent Privy Council decision in Mohammed v The 
State. The Privy Council was asked to consider submissions that the 
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago called for the creation of an absolute 
exclusionary rule, or in the alternative a prima facie rule of exclusion. 
Subsequently it was held that the judge had to conduct a balancing exercise 
that weighed the interests of the community against the interests of the 
individual.38 The Court examined New Zealand's prima facie rule of 
exclusion, and stated that they had arrived at "a view that does not entirely 
accord the view which has prevailed in New Zealand."39 
37 R v Crayso11 a11d Taylor, above n 3, 412 . 
38 Mohammed v The State, above n 2, 123. 
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While the Court of Appeal had already signalled its dissatisfaction with the 
prima facie rule in Grayson and Taylor, the Privy Council decision gave it 
justification to review the rule. The Court of Appeal appeared eager to 
emphasise that the decision would not greatly impact the effectiveness of the 
Bill of Rights when it quoted the Privy Council, "the stamp of constitutionality 
on a citizen's rights is not meaningless: it is clear testimony that an added 
value is attached to the protection of the right."40 However, the very real 
concern remains that the while the approach of the Court of Appeal gives 
value to the protected right, this value is significantly less than what appeared 
to be accorded to the Bill of Rights under the prima facie exclusionary rule. 
B South Africa 
Prior to the introduction of the South African Constitution in 1996, 
admissibility of evidence in South Africa was determined on the basis of 
whether or not the evidence was relevant.41 If it was deemed relevant then the 
Courts were not concerned with how it was obtained.42 While admissibility of 
evidence is now determined under the 1996 Constitution, South Africa went 
through a period of two years when it had an interim Constitution after the fall 
39 Mohammed v The State, above n 2, 124. 
40 Mohammed v The State, above n 2, 124. 
41 Dr Penuell Maduna, "The South African Bill of Rights and Collection of Evidence in 
Criminal Matters" (Paper presented to the 14111 Conference of the International Society for the 
Reform of Criminal Law, Sand ton, South Africa, 6 December 2000), 
<http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Maduna.pdf> (last accessed 12 August 2002) 
42 Kuruma Son of Ka11i11 v R [1955] l All ER 236, 239 (PC). 
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of the Nationalist government.43 Like the New Zealand Bill of Rights, the 
interim Constitution was silent on the issue of admissibility of evidence 
obtained through a breach of rights. In this short period in South Africa there 
was strong judicial debate over whether there should be judicial discretion to 
admit evidence on the grounds of public policy, or whether tainted evidence 
should be excluded unless the breach could be justified. 
In S v Melani and others it was determined that exclusion of evidence was a 
remedy that could only be deviated from if it brought the administration of 
justice into disrepute.44 However, a year later it was held that the Canadian 
disrepute test was too nan-ow, and that the Irish approach of requiring 
"extraordinary excusing circumstances" for admitting evidence would be more 
satisfactory.45 The Court approved the Irish case of The People (Attorney 
General) v O'Brien, and emphasised that "the vindication and the protection of 
constitutional rights is a fundamental matter for all courts ... [and] that duty 
cannot yield place to any other competing interest."46 The diverging views of 
the judiciary in this short interim period meant that the law was always 
unsettled, but the debate did manage to highlight the importance of not 
overlooking breaches of rights unless there were very compelling reasons. 
43 This interim Constitution was in force from the first all-race election in 1994, and was 
repealed by the Constitution of 1996. 
4
~ S v Melani a1Zd others [1996] I All SA 137, 151 (E) . 
45 S v Mot/011tsi [ 1996] l All SA 27, 35 (C). 
46 S v Motloutsi, above n 45, 35 (C). 
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This debate was resolved by section 35(5) of the 1996 Constitution, which 
included a qualified exclusionary rule requiring that evidence obtained from a 
breach of the Bill of Rights be excluded if it would result in an unfair trial or if 
its admission would be detrimental to the administration of justice. In S v 
Shongwe47 it was dete1mined that like the Canadian position and the earlier 
overturned decision of S v Melani en Andere, Courts could take at a range of 
factors into account when deciding the likely disrepute of justice. While the 
disrepute of justice test allows for assessing the impact that exclusion would 
have on the public, it is not as likely as New Zealand's balancing exercise to 
lead to the exclusion of evidence. Unlike the New Zealand Court of Appeal, 
which has indicated that public interest in a conviction can result in evidence 
being admitted, South African Courts have decided that despite public interest, 
evidence must be excluded if it would be detrimental to the administration of 
· · 48 Justice. 
Interestingly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal failed to make any reference 
to South African debate on the issue of exclusion of evidence. The neglect of 
very relevant South African jurisprudence is concerning, especially as it would 
have been of great help to the Court in recognising issues both for and against 
the retention of the prima facie rule. The South African experience would have 
helped to strengthen the argument for retaining the prima facie rule, if not 
47 S v Shongwe [ 1998] 3 All SA 549 (T). 
48 S v Myen.i (31 May 2002) South African Supreme Court, para 30 
<http://www.uovs.ac.za/faculties/law/appeals/in022/3 l 050211.htm> (last accessed 24 August 
2002) 
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because of judicial support for the rule, then because the legislature saw fit to 
incorporate a qualified exclusionary rule in section 35(5) of the Constitution 
after two years of debate. 
C Ireland 
The Constitution of Ireland is silent on any specific remedies for breaches, but 
article 40, section 3(1) states that "the State guarantees in its laws to respect, 
and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the rights of the 
citizen." This provision has been interpreted as creating a right to have 
evidence excluded when the constitution is breached through a conscious and 
deliberate act. 49 The Court of Appeal in Shaheed briefly described the position 
in Ireland, but there was no commentary on why such a stance had been 
adopted, or why such a stance would not work in New Zealand. 
The Irish Courts chose an exclusionary rule because "the defence and 
vindication of the constitutional rights of the citizen is a duty superior to that 
of trying such a citizen for a criminal offence."50 This stance is almost directly 
opposing that of the New Zealand Court of Appeal , which consistently 
stressed that public interest in convictions can overcome the need to vindicate 
49 The People (Attorney-General) v O 'Brien [1965] IR 142 (SC). This does not create a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as the requirement that the breach be 'conscious and 
deliberate ' refers to the act and not the intent. 
50 The People (Attorney-General) v O 'Brien , above n 49, 170. 
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the rights of the accused.51 While the Court of Appeal does not have to justify 
its decision in terms of Irish case law, the dramatic departure from Bill of 
Rights ' case law merits in-depth analysis of jurisdictions that have already 
contemplated such a move. Such an analysis would inevitably lead to the 
Court of Appeal acknowledging that the New Zealand Bill of Rights is not a 
powerful tool when considering exclusion of evidence, especially when 
compared with jurisdictions like Ireland. Rather than upholding the enshrined 
rights , the Shaheed decision has reduced the Bill of Rights to merely a 
significant factor that is to be taken into account. 
D Canada 
The Court of Appeal undertook a significant discussion on the Canadian 
position on exclusion, but decided not to follow their decisions. Under section 
24(2) of the Canadian Charter, evidence will be excluded if a protected right 
was breached, and its admission would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The Courts take a "generous approach" to determine a breach52 and 
then conduct a balancing exercise to determine the likely disrepute of justice.53 
While at first glance this may appear to be similar to the New Zealand exercise 
that takes into account public interest, the balancing approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court is seriously constricted. In the interest of a fair trial, self-
5 1 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 421 per Blanchard J. 
52 R v Bartle [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, 208 . 
53 R v Collins [1987] I S.C.R . 265,281. 
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incriminating evidence is usually excluded,54 while good faith on the part of 
the police will be given little weight. 55 
While not rejecting the Canadian disrepute test outright, the Court of Appeal 
repeatedly emphasised that the Canadian test allowed evidence to be admitted 
if public interest was such that the justice system would be brought into 
disrepute by its exclusion.56 The purpose of the Canadian approach is to 
prevent improperly obtained evidence impinging on the fairness of the trial, to 
deter police misconduct, and to maintain judicial integrity.57 While the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal would exclude evidence to uphold trial fairness, the 
other factors motivating the Supreme Court were not cited as reasons 
prompting the move towards the balancing exercise. Instead the Court of 
Appeal found itself emphasising that in Canada the taking into account of 
community views did not mean that the public opm10n had become a 
determinative factor. 58 This could be viewed as an attempt to allay fears that 
the new balancing exercise will be trial by opinion poll. 
E Other Comparable Jurisdictions 
54 R v Stillman [1997] l S.C.R. 607. Self-incriminating evidence includes confessions and real 
evidence (including evidence derived from the accused) obtained with the participation of the 
accused. 
55 R v Si111111011s [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495. 
56 R v Shaheed, above 11 1, 406 per Blanchard J. 
57 Debra Osborn, "Suppressing the Truth: Judicial Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence in 
the United States, Canada, England and Australia" (2000) Murdoch University Electronic 
Journal of Law, para 29, <www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n4/osborn74_text.html> (last 
accessed 23 August 2002). 
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1 The United States of America 
The automatic exclusion rule for evidence obtained through a breach of the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, was dissected at quite some length by 
the majority-of-three judgement in Shaheed. 59 The deterrence centred nature of 
this remedy may be effective in the United States, but the Court of Appeal has 
repeatedly stated that any remedy in New Zealand should be based on 
vindication of the breached rights rather than deterring police misconduct.60 
From the United States jurisprudence it was noted that there was a growing 
movement to create a "good faith" exception, whereby evidence would be 
admitted where the police action was pursued in good faith. 61 However, this is 
of minimal relevance to New Zealand as at present the good faith exception 
has been limited to instances where a search warrant has been relied on in 
good faith. 62 
The analysis of United States case law was used to illustrate the high social 
costs of having an exclusionary rule that did not take into account public 
interest.63 While strict application of the rule in the United States was never 
going to be applicable to New Zealand's situation, it helped to illustrate the 
social costs of having a rule that conferred a benefit of such magnitude on the 
defendant. However, its assistance to the judges in modifying or replacing the 
58 R v Shaheed, above n 1,404 per Blanchard J. 
59 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and seizure. 
60 R v Shaheed, above n 1,418 per Blanchard J . 
6 1 R v Shaheed, above n 1,401 per Blanchard J. 
62 United States v Leon ( 1984) 468 US 897. 
63 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 399 per Blanchard J. 
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prima facie rule of exclusion was always going to be more limited than the 
help provided by other jurisdictions. 
2 England 
Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, judges have an express 
discretion on the admissibility of evidence. In the leading case of Attorney-
General's Reference, judicial discretion was used to take into account the 
interests of the accused, the victim and their family, and the public.64 The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal approved of the more flexible approach that had been 
developed by the Law Lords, and indicated that in New Zealand the possibility 
of such an approach had existed, but had not been implemented.65 A test that 
weighs up all considerations is appropriate when exercising judicial discretion , 
but as Elias CJ points out, Parliament has already struck the balance when it 
enacted the Bill of Rights. 66 
A notable feature is that Lord Cooke of Thorndon sat on the Attorney-
General's Reference and stated that New Zealand's position was that evidence 
obtained through a breach was prima facie inadmissible, "subject to exceptions 
created by the oveniding demands of justice."67 While this is just obiter 
· dictum from an overseas judge, it is particularly pertinent to New Zealand 
64 Attorney-General's Reference (No 3 of 1999) [1999] 2 AC 91, 118 (HL). 
65 R v Shaheed, above n 1,418 per Blanchard J. 
66 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 385 per Elias CJ dissenting. 
67 Attorney-General's Reference, above n 64, 120 per Lord Cooke of Thorndon. 
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given Lord Cooke's previous involvement with the development of New 
Zealand Bill of Rights' case law on the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The 
exceptions to the prima facie rule of exclusion are glossed over in the Shaheed 
decision, and maybe the Court of Appeal missed an opportunity to reform the 
rule. This could have been done by enlarging Cooke's exceptions that allow 
the prima facie rule to reflect the demands of justice. 
F Conclusion 
Prior to Shaheed, New Zealand's prima facie rule of exclusion was relatively 
moderate when compared with approaches to exclusion in comparable 
jurisdictions. At one extreme is the automatic exclusion of the United States, 
and Ireland ' s readiness to exclude any evidence from a breach that was not 
accidental. New ZeaJand ' s rebuttable presumption of exclusion was not as 
likely to result in admission of evidence as Canada's balancing approach 
(aJbeit exclusive of self-incriminating evidence) and the balancing approach 
adopted by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The omission of South 
African case law from analysis, which had adopted a qualified exclusionary 
rule similar to New Zealand ' s, was a significant oversight. It would have been 
very helpful to the Court of Appeal in analysing the flaws and benefits of both 
, the prima facie rule and the balancing exercise. 
While the decision to revoke the prima facie rule of exclusion was motivated 
by the recent Privy Council decision, it was not made out of any necessity to 
23 
bring New Zealand's position into line with other jurisdictions. After a decade 
of experience with the Bill of Rights, the Court of Appeal has now moved 
New Zealand ' s position more towards a common Jaw position; a position that 
is more likely to allow the admissibility of evidence obtained through a breach. 
V EFFECTS OF THE SHAHEED DECISION 
A Introduction 
While the majority-of-three judgement states that the new approach "should 
not lead, in most cases, to results different from those envisaged in earlier 
judgements of this Court",68 the reasoning behind this belief is faulty. The 
removal of the onus from the prosecution to provide good reasons for 
admissibility is not just a matter of semantics. It will mean that the defence 
now has to present a full argument outlining why the breach of the Bill of 
Rights outweighs all the factors in favour of admission. While such a full 
debate would be beneficial in outlining the consequences of admission and 
exclusion, it is more than likely that the new test will alter future results. 
Evidence is likely to be admitted under the balancing exercise because of the 
' increase in the multitude of criteria that must be examined by judges in each 
case. The factors to be taken into consideration include the need for 
proportionality and a credible justice system, whether the breach was 
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deliberate, whether other investigative techniques were available to the police, 
the centrality of the evidence, and the seriousness of the offence.69 One 
commentator has described this balancing test as "not really a 'test' at all - it is 
a matter of throwing all ingredients into the pot and later checking for 
flavour."70 The varying weights that wilJ be given to these factors by varying 
judges is going to lead to debate that will distract from the defence's emphasis 
that rights have been breached. While the prima facie rule of exclusion may 
not have been working as desired, the increased discretion available to judges 
under the new balancing test will lead to more cases where evidence obtained 
through a breach will be admitted. 
B The Rationale Behind the Decision 
1 Concern over automatic exclusion 
A notable feature of the judgements is the lack of analysis given to justifying 
the departure from the prima facie rule of exclusion . While there is significant 
scrutiny of the development of the prima facie rule of exclusion in New 
Zealand, no evidence is presented to show that the rule was not working. The 
majority seemed to rely on the proposition that the prima facie rule of 
exclusion had in essence become a rule of automatic exclusion and lamented 
the fact that "in practice the exclusion of evidence has followed almost 
68 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 422 per Blanchard J. 
69 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 387 per Blanchard J. 
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automatically once it has been established that there has been a breach."71 The 
Judges did not analyse a single case where there was an unsatisfactory result, 
and there seemed to be a reluctance to criticise their earlier judgements. 
Elias CJ not only disagreed with the principles behind the balancing exercise, 
but also stated, "It is not at all clear that the direction that the presumption can 
be displaced for good reason is not being conscientiously followed."72 A more 
detailed examination of New Zealand case law was needed to support the 
claim of the majority that judges were almost automatically excluding 
evidence where there was a breach of the Bill of Rights. 
The Solicitor-General proposed that R v Pratt was a case illustrating that the 
prima facie rule of exclusion had become a rule of automatic exclusion, and 
where the social cost of excluding the evidence was too high.73 The Bench did 
not discuss this, but it is submitted that R v Pratt is a case where exclusion of 
evidence was the only satisfactory result. The case involved the accused being 
strip-searched by police in a public street, whereby a key was found that 
connected him with a locker containing a substantial quantity of cocaine. It 
was noted that while the key was crucial in order to obtain a conviction the 
police had acted in a manner that was most definitely unreasonable.74 To claim 
' that the prima facie rule of exclusion should be discarded because it allows a 
70 Robert Lithgow, "Criminal Practice Section" (May 2002) NZLJ 151. 
71 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 4 J 8 per Blanchard J. 
72 R v Shaheed, above n I , 385 per Elias CJ dissenting. 
73 R v Pratt ll994] 3 NZLR 21 (CA). 
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drug-dealer to have a conviction quashed, takes the spotlight off the 
outrageous actions of the police. While there is an obvious social interest in 
convicting drug dealers, to remove the onus on the police to act reasonably 
when there is such an interest is to drastically reduce the protection afforded to 
citizens by the Bill of Rights. 
The decision that the accused's rights will no longer be a determinative factor 
was made without considering under what circumstances the prima facie rule 
of exclusion could be displaced. Under the rule adopted by Cooke P in 
Butcher, the onus fell on the prosecution to show good cause for admitting the 
evidence. Rather than the majority refining this rule by reminding judges that 
the tendency towards exclusion could be displaced, they decided, "A prima 
facie rule does not have the appearance of adequately addressing the interest 
of the community."75 It was perfectly feasible for the Court of Appeal to take 
the opportunity presented in this case to not only express that it felt that the 
prima facie rule of exclusion was not working in its cuITent form , but to reform 
the rule. Rather than abolishing the rule completely the Court could have 
created a category of exception to the prima facie rule that would allow judges 
to take into account factors such as the likely disrepute of justice caused by 
exclusion. This would still uphold the rights in the Bill of Rights and would 
keep the onus on the prosecution to show good cause for admitting the 
evidence. 
74 R v Pratt, above n 73, 26. 
75 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 419 per Blanchard J (emphas is added) . 
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2 Judicial technique 
The decision in this case was motivated by an attempt to ensure a "judicial 
technique which involves a greater exercise of judgement."76 The increased 
judicial discretion over the admissibility of evidence will allow the judges to 
make case-by-case decisions that reflect community interests in allowing 
evidence to be admitted for more serious crimes. While this may create more 
uncertainty in this area of the law, the majority believed that "the 
conscientious caiTying out of the balancing exercise will at least demonstrate 
that the rights has been taken seriously."77 As Anderson J pointed out, "in 
theory, the prima facie exclusionary approach would have achieved the same 
result as that reached in this case but in practice that method has become blunt 
with use." 78 
As illustrated, the prima facie rule of exclusion has increasingly been seen as a 
restraint on the judiciary's attempt to tailor remedies for specific 
circumstances. The balancing test is a direct result of a desire to remove the 
constraint on judges over the matter of evidence exclusion, and to end the 
artificial constructions that were adopted by the judiciary to circumvent the 
prima facie rule. 
76 R v Shaheed, above 11 1, 422 per B la11chard J. 
77 R v Shaheed , above 11 1, 419 per B la11chard J. 
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3 Desire to reflect society's interests 
Among the motivations for the move towards the balancing exercise is the 
need to provide proportionate responses to breaches of the Bill of Rights.79 
Determining whether exclusion is a proportionate response is done through a 
balancing process that starts with giving significant weight to the fact that 
there has been a breach. The need for proportionality recognises that society 
has an interest in seeing the conviction of serious offenders as "a system of 
justice will not command the respect of the community if each and every 
substantial breach of an accused's rights leads almost inevitably to the 
exclusion of crucial evidence."80 The p1ima facie rule of exclusion no longer 
had the appearance of maintaining an effective and credible system of justice, 
which is something that the majority hoped to fix by allowing flexible 
responses to questions of exclusion of evidence. 
A disconcerting aspect of the decision in Shaheed is that the centrality of the 
evidence to the prosecution ' s case and the seriousness of the crime are factors 
that will be taken into account when deciding if the evidence should be 
adrnitted. 81 Excluding evidence in one case because it is not vital for a 
conviction, and allowing it in another simply because without it the 
prosecution's case would fail , wiJI bring the administration of justice into 
78 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 431 per Anderson J. 
19 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 422 per Blanchard J. 
80 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 419 per Blanchard J. 
81 R v Shaheed , above n I , 419 per Blanchard J. 
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disrepute. Yet this is a potential outcome of a balancing test that assesses how 
crucial the evidence is before deciding on admissibility. Likewise a breach of 
the rights of an accused burglar may result in the exclusion of evidence, while 
the same breach of rights of an accused murderer may be overlooked because 
the crime is so serious. 
This position is in direct contrast with earlier Bill of Rights case law. In R v 
Accused the trial judge decided that the prima facie rule should be displaced 
because the crime was so serious.82 This was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal who held that the seriousness of the crime was not a factor that should 
be balanced against the a breach of a fundamental right. 83 
While the Court of Appeal emphasised in Shaheed that they do not want the 
infringed right to be seen as less valuable to certain offenders, this is an 
obvious outcome.84 A major benefit of the prima facie rule of exclusion was 
that it applied equally to all offences and to all breaches of an individual ' s 
rights. Equality before the law and equal application of the law are 
fundamental principles of the rule of law, and it appears that the Shaheed 
decision infringes these principles. The change to the balancing test now 
creates the appearance that the Courts are interested in upholding an 
individual ' s rights , but only so far as those rights do not significantly interfere 
82 R v Accused (1994) 11 CRNZ 380 (CA). 
83 R v Accused (1994) 11 CRNZ 380, 382 per Richardson J. 
84 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 421 per Blanchard J. 
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with the prosecution ' s case or do not prevent the prosecution of a serious 
offence. 
C The Need for Effective Remedies 
Arguably the greatest impact of the decision in Shaheed is that it will be more 
likely to lead to the admission of evidence and therefore deny what may be the 
most effective remedy for the accused. While the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
does not explicitly require a remedy for a breach of a right, the need for 
remedies has had judicial support since Cooke P stated, "we would fail in our 
duty if we did not give an effective remedy to a person whose legislatively 
affirmed rights have been infringed."85 The recognition in Simpson v Attorney-
General (Baigent 's Case)86 of the need for effective recourse against State 
action is an integral part of New Zealand Bill of Rights' case law, and is the 
main factor for the development of the prima facie rule of exclusion. However, 
the Court in Shaheed believed that the prima facie rule of exclusion was not 
consistent with the notion of tailoring remedies for differing circumstances. 87 
A relevant issue now is whether under the new balancing exercise New 
Zealand Courts can still deliver an effective remedy to those who have had 
their rights infringed. 
85 Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 , 676 (CA) per Cooke P. 
86 Baigent 's Case, above n 85 . 
87 R v Shaheed , above n l, 419 per Blanchard J. 
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It is important to note that in his dissent in R v Te Kira, Thomas J commented 
that the need for an effective remedy "cannot mean that a remedy must or 
should be available every time a person ' s rights are infringed under the Bill of 
Rights Act. "88 While pragmatism may require not providing remedies for 
merely technical breaches, adopting a viewpoint whereby the Bill of Rights 
can be infringed without providing adequate recourse is dangerous . Not only 
does it degrade the status of the Bill of Rights, but it does little to endorse New 
Zealand's international obligations. 
1 International obligations 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights89 New Zealand 
has international obligations to provide an effective remedy to those who have 
had their rights infringed. This obligation was affirmed in McVeagh v A-G 
where O'Regan J refeITed to article 2(3), which requires parties to the 
Covenant to ensure that any person whose rights and freedoms are violated 
have an effective remedy.90 New Zealand's ratification of the Covenant in 
1978, and its subsequent affirmation in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 means that the international covenant is of great importance when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
88 R v Te Kira , above n 19 , 283 per Thomas J di ssenting. 
89 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
90 Mc Veagh v A -C (2001] 3 NZLR 566 (HC). 
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A decision that needs to be looked at when interpreting what effect the 
Covenant will have on remedies in New Zealand is Khan v United Kingdom.91 
This case was held in the European Court of Human Rights, where the 
applicant was appealing against a conviction of drug offences after police used 
a secret listening device to obtain evidence against him. While the Court held 
that there had been a breach of article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which guaranteed respect for private life and con-espondence, 
the Court also ruled that the admissibility of evidence was a matter for 
regulation under national law.92 Like article 2(3) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, article 13 of the European Convention 
guaranteed an effective remedy at a national level. Yet despite this guarantee 
the Court still found that it was a matter for domestic regulation. 
In his dissent in Khan, Judge Loucaides stated, "The exclusion of such 
evidence in my view, becomes even more imperative in cases like the present, 
where no alternative effective remedy exists against the breach of the relevant 
right."93 In light of this opinion it is possible to make an argument that the 
retention of the prima facie rule of exclusion in New Zealand is a necessary 
requirement to give effect to New Zealand's international obligations and to 
also ensure that exclusion is mandated where there are no other alternative 
effective remedies. However, if the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights were to be interpreted in the same way as the European 
91 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EI-IRR 45. 
92 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EI-IRR 45 , para 34. 
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Convention in Khan then it is doubtful that the requirement of an effective 
remedy would have any influence on decisions of the Court. While the 
Covenant will not be domestically enforceable in New Zealand law it should 
still be persuasive on New Zealand Courts when determining access to an 
effective remedy. Interestingly, when discarding the prima facie rule of 
exclusion the Court of Appeal made no mention of New Zealand's 
international obligations to ensure an effective remedy to those who have their 
rights infringed. 
2 Real evidence 
Unlike confessional evidence, real or tangible evidence is unique because it 
exists in its own right, regardless of whether there has been a breach of the Bill 
of Rights. Prior to Shaheed New Zealand Courts had not made a formal 
distinction between the admissibility of confessional and real evidence 
obtained through a breach of the Bill of Rights. Instead the Court has preferred 
to hear submissions on whether real evidence should be admitted because its 
discovery was inevitable regardless of the breach.94 
However, in this case a distinction is drawn between confessional evidence 
and real evidence. Blanchard J states that a confession obtained through a 
breach of rights may be excluded due to doubts about its reliability but that, 
93 Khan v United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 45 , para 0-17 per Judge Loucaides dissenting. 
94 R v Butcher and Burgess, above n 14,267. 
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"where real evidence ... has been found, even as a result of a confession, the 
probative value of that discovery may be a weighty factor." 95 Leaving the door 
open for admitting real evidence, whose discovery is wholly dependent on an 
inadmissible confession, raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of a 
remedy to someone who confesses after having their right to counsel denied. 
By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Stillman found it more helpful 
to classify evidence as either conscriptive or non-conscriptive.96 Recognising 
the self-incriminating nature of real evidence such as bodily samples, the 
Court held that real evidence conscripted from the accused would be just as 
likely to result in an unfair trial as a self-incriminating confession.97 The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal rejected this approach, which favours exclusion of 
conscripted evidence. The Court adopted the line that the admission of 
evidence will not lead to an unfair trial unless the evidence is unreliable 
enough to lead to an unsafe verdict. 98 The significant divergence between the 
two Courts is best explained by the overwhelming need of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal to retain a discretion over the exclusion of evidence that arises 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Breaches of many of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights , such as the right 
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, will often result in the police 
95 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 420 per Blanchard J. 
96 R v Stillman, above n 54, 652. 
97 R v Stillman , above n 54, 655. 
98 R v Shaheed. above n 1, 420 per Blanchard J. 
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obtaining real evidence. Unlike the Canadian approach, the majority has 
adopted a test whereby a threshold of a potentiaJly unsafe verdict must be 
reached before the probative nature of real evidence is deemed to be 
outweighed by the need for exclusion.99 For an accused the most effective 
remedy is exclusion of the evidence that stemmed from the breach. Therefore, 
if evidence obtained from a breach is not excluded how effective would 
alternative remedies be to the accused? 
3 Alternative remedies 
The majority in Shaheed recognised that cases would exist where improperly 
obtained evidence would be admissible and the offender would have to seek 
alternative remedies such as Baigent damages or a reduced sentence. All the 
Judges acknowledged that such a claim would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute, but there appears to be little alternative if Baigent's Case 
is not to be overturned. 100 Where evidence has been admitted and a convicted 
criminal is able to claim damages against the police, would the compensation 
metered out to such an individual be lessened to reduce public outcry? If 
compensation to convicted criminals brings the administration of justice into 
disrepute then it is likely that such compensation would not compare 
favourably to that which innocent individuals would receive after having their 
rights breached. There is the very real possibility that the Bill of Rights will 
99 R v Shaheed, above 11 1, 420 per B la11chard J. 
100 R v Shaheed, above 11 J, 421 per B la11chard J. 
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become less of a shield for individuals once it is decided that the evidence in 
question should be admitted. 
Furthermore, by stating that the question of alternative remedies for a breach 
will not be considered when contemplating exclusion, the Court of Appeal is 
removing the possibility of debate on whether the accused is entitled to an 
effective remedy. 101 In some situations where conviction would have very 
detrimental effects, exclusion of evidence may not only be the most effective 
remedy, but the only effective remedy. It is necessary for the Court to consider 
as part of its balancing exercise whether is also denying the only effective 
remedy when it is ruling out exclusion. 
D Diminishing of Rights 
1 Comparison with common law admissibility 
The balancing approach adopted by the Court of Appeal may not only deny the 
most effective remedy, but it also diminishes the importance of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights as a protector of rights. The balancing exercise is the 
same method that was used to determine admissibility prior to the introduction 
of the Bill of Rights. The only significant difference between common law 
admissibility and the Shaheed test is that the Shaheed test requires a breach of 
a right before the balancing test is undertaken. In future cases where 
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admissibility is challenged under common law principles as well as under the 
Shaheed balancing test, it appears that there will be very few circumstances 
when the results will differ under either approach. 
Chief Justice Elias summed up the argument succinctly, implying that the 
majority test is the common law test under another name, "The effect of the 
majority judgement in the present case is that breach of the rights ... simply 
informs the balancing required by the common law." 102 While significant 
weight will be given to the rights that have been breached, the rights of the 
individual have simply become a factor to be taken into account in the exercise 
of judicial discretion. 
The Bill of Rights has been effectively been relegated to a code of individual 
rights that the Court will take into account when examining whether exclusion 
is a proportionate response to a breach of a right. The Court of Appeal adopted 
the words of the Privy Council in Mohammed v The State when they described 
that a breach would be a "cogent factor militating in favour of exclusion." 
103 
This statement is little more than a superficial guarantee that the Bill of Rights 
is still an important aspect in the balancing test. Elias CJ makes her displeasure 
obvious when she states that breaches are "relegated to an important factor 
militating against admission in the exercise of a broad discretion."
104 
While the 
10 1 R v Shaheed , above n l , 421 per Blanchard J. 
102 R v Shah eed , above n l , 384 per Elias CJ dissenting. 
103 R v Shah eed , above n I , 419 per Blanchard J. 
10~ R v Shaheed , above n 1, 384 per Elias CJ di ssenting. 
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Court has made it clear that the Bill of Rights is still relevant, it is the 
broadness of the discretion that has undermined the rights enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights. 
2 Diminishing of individual rights 
The decision of the Court of Appeal to revoke the prima facie rule is also 
likely to diminish the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. It is necessary to 
note that rights are not absolute and are subject under section 5 to "reasonable 
limits prescribed by law". Therefore, to establish a breach it is already 
necessary to balance competing interests. The approach of the majority 
indicates that it will be necessary to conduct a balancing test to resolve the 
issue of the breach, and then to conduct a similar balancing test using the same 
factors to resolve the admissibility of the evidence. Far from causing an 
enhancement of judicial technique, the balancing approach has the potential to 
lead to double counting as the court has to reconsider issues of reasonableness. 
While the prima facie rule of exclusion was circumvented in cases such as 
Grayson and Taylor by finding that there was no breach of the Bill of Rights, 
there is the possibility that because of this decision, courts will be more willing 
to acknowledge a breach. A willingness to find that there had been a breach 
would allow the balancing exercise to be conducted only on the issue of a 
remedy. This could lead to the position in Canada where it is accepted that "in 
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the initial inquiry as to whether evidence has been obtained in a manner that 
infringed or denied rights, courts should take a generous approach.',1os Readily 
accepting that there has been a breach of the Bill of Rights without conducting 
an inquiry into the competing interests will lead to an erosion of the affirmed 
right. 
Justice Blanchard admits the undesirability of conducting two balancing 
· h h 106 exercises w en e states , 
Where the police have without practical justification departed from the 
standards required by the law, it is better that the breach be marked by a 
statement from the court that their behaviour was unreasonable; and that 
the decision whether or not to exclude the resulting evidence is then made 
on a principled basis in light of that conclusion. 
A willingness to find a breach and then deal with public policy issues when 
addressing the remedy may undermine the rights in the Bill of Rights. It is 
possible that future debate on the competing interests that make up an 
enshrined right will be limited, as such arguments will be made on the issue of 
a remedy. Such an outcome is not a problem in a case where the breach has 
been admitted by the police, but where the breach is contested, the balancing 
approach "is likely to lead to erosion of the rights affirmed in the legislation by 
double-counting, in the balancing of remedy, other public interests already 
balanced in the determination of breach."
107 
105 R v Shaheed, above n 1,403 per Blanchard J. 
106 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 4 l 8 per Blanchard J. 
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3 Primafacie rule as a standard for police conduct 
If infringed rights are simply one of many factors to be taken into account and 
are marked with only a statement from the court, then the role of the Bill of 
Rights as a guide to police conduct is lessened. Although the majority 
indicated they did not want an approach based on deterrence, this was one of 
the inevitable by-products of the prima facie rule. There is little doubt that the 
rejection of the prima facie rule of exclusion has now opened the door for 
questionable investigating techniques to be used so long as they can be 
justified by factors such as the nature of the evidence and the availability of 
other investigative techniques. 
The balancing exercise may also lead to the peculiar situation where police 
have to decide whether the public interest outweighs the indi viduaJ' s rights 
before starting any action. Without the benefit of one standard for a11, police 
will need to decide whether their conduct will be unreasonable (in the case of 
section 21), and then whether the public interest outweighs any breach. 
The advantage of the prima facie rule of exclusion was that is was concise and 
clear. If police conduct breached the Bill of Rights in obtaining evidence then 
that evidence was excluded unless there were good reasons for admitting it. 
Now the balancing test essentially means that evidence is going to be 
admissible unless there are good reasons that it should not be. This new test 
107 R v Shaheed , above n 1, 385 per Elias CJ di ssenting. 
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encourages police to breach the Bill of Rights and to bring the contentious 
evidence before the courts, putting the onus on the defence to exclude it. Far 
from being the guide to police conduct that it has been, the Bill of Right's 
status has been drastically lessened. While the majority stated that deliberate 
abuse of rights by police would lean towards exclusion, the fact remains that if 
police are unable to secure a conviction without breaching rights then there is 
little deterrence to prevent them from violating an individual's rights. Judges 
are all going to be giving different weights to different factors during the 
balancing exercise and the increased likelihood of evidence being admitted 
means that the Bill of Rights is no longer going to be as significant a guide to 
police conduct as it has been. 
4 Good faith 
The issue whether the good faith of police should be given any weight on the 
side of admissibility of evidence was rejected in Goodwin. 108 Cooke P 
emphasised that such a proposition would mean that "ignorance of the law 
would become an excuse and the less an officer understood about a person ' s 
rights the less the law would protect those rights."
109 However, this is a 
viewpoint that appears to have been overtaken by the position adopted by the 
Court in Shaheed. 
108 R v Goodwin, above n 16, 153. 
109 R v Goodwin, above n 16, 172 per Cooke P. 
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The majority statement that "good faith will in itself often be merely a neutral 
factor" 110 is self-serving when it is taken in conjunction with the significant 
weight that deliberate breaches will be given in favour of exclusion. The 
judgement emphasised that deliberate breaches would be likely to result in 
exclusion, but also declared that, "action not known to be a breach of rights 
does not merit the same degree of condemnation." 111 In essence the mental 
state of the police officers in question has now become relevant. While good 
faith on the part of the police will not lead directly to the admission of 
evidence, it is a factor that can be taken into account when conducting the 
balancing test. In the view of commentator Robert Lithgow such a stance will 
mean that from a police point of view "the more nai've the better." 112 The 
balancing exercise will more adequately reflect society's interest in seeing 
criminals convicted, but there is the very real danger that it "invites the 
'pernicious doctrine' that in criminal law the end justifies the means."
113 
E Future Impact of Shaheed Decision 
The decision in Shaheed will have a significant impact on future Bill of Rights 
cases. Courts are going to be asked to re-examine cases in areas that have been 
considered settled. The new balancing test adopted is not just confined to 
search and seizure cases, and judgements in other Bill of Rights areas are 
11 0 R v Shaheed, above n l , 420 per Blanchard J. 
111 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 420 per Blanchard J. 
11 2 Lithgow, above n 70,151. 
11 3 R v Shaheed, above n 1, 385 per Elias CJ dissenting. 
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going to come under scrutiny. The full impact that the decision will have on 
the admissibility of evidence and the strength of the Bill of Rights will not be 
evident for some time, but already there is an indication of the direction that 
the Courts will take. 
The case of R v !le/ 14 was one of the first cases to implement the balancing 
test of Shaheed. In this case Priestley J of the High Court made a peculiar 
comment that, "the balancing exercise does not alter the analysis and 
result." 115 While the result may have been the same in this case under the 
prima facie rule, the analysis adopted by the Judge tends to indicate confusion 
about the steps the Shaheed judgements laid down for judges to follow. This 
case supports the view that allowing judges to take a myriad of factors into 
account will create confusion as judges give different weights to different 
factors. 
Another case that has had to apply Shaheed was R v I, 116 which resulted in 
evidence of drug supplying being excluded due to arbitrary detention under 
section 22 of the Bill of Rights. A major factor that was taken into account by 
the Court was that "the quantity of drugs was small and they were not of the 
most serious type." 117 This indicates that the Court would have overlooked the 
same breach and admitted the evidence if the accused was charged with a more 
114 R v lies (10 April 2002) High Court Auckland T012095, Priestley J. 
115 R v Iles, above n 114, para 15 per Priestley J. 
116 R v I (17 June 2002), CA 71/02. 
117 R v I, above n 116, para 20 per Anderson J. 
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serious cnme. While these recent cases illustrate that judges are still 
attempting to give weight to the Bill of Rights, there are concerns about the 
effect of the decision. The desire of the Court in Shaheed to take into account 
societal interest in convicting criminals, with the side effect of diminishing 
equality before the law, has eventuated. 
The confusion over how the Shaheed decision should be applied in lower 
courts is evident in the recent case of R v Maihi 11 8 where on appeal the trial 
judge's decision was overturned. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial 
judge conducting a single balancing test to simultaneously determine the 
reasonableness of police action and to decide the issue of admissibility under 
the Shaheed test. 119 This highlights the obvious problem arising out of 
expecting judges to conduct two separate balancing exercises to determine the 
breach and the remedy, both of which essentially involve the same factors. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Kau
120 is a startling application of 
Shaheed. The accused was appealing the admission of a police interview on 
the basis that his right to refrain from making a statement under section 23(4) 
had been abused. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the breach and after 
pointing out that counsel had not refeITed to Shaheed, the Court excluded the 
evidence. They then made the extraordinary comment, "Had we been required 
to undertake the balancing exercise set out in R v Shaheed we would 
118 R v Maihi (22 August 2002) , CA 181/02. 
119 R v Maihi, above n 118, para 4. 
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unhesitangly have regarded exclusion ... to be a proportionate response to the 
breach." 121 The decision to exclude the evidence once a breach was established 
without conducting a balancing exercise on the issue of exclusion, contradicts 
the entire rationale behind discarding the prima facie rule of exclusion. The 
three judges have totally misunderstood the nature of the decision in Shaheed, 
for it is not possible for them to exclude evidence under the Bill of Rights 
without conducting the new balancing test. These sorts of problems highlight 
the confusion that the decision in Shaheed has brought to Bill of Rights Jaw. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Shaheed to replace the prima facie rule 
of exclusion with a balancing test that places significant weight on the fact that 
a breach has occurred, is likely to lead to more problems than it resolves. The 
decision was motivated by a perception that the prima facie rule had in effect 
become a rule of absolute exclusion. It was therefore decided to follow the 
recent Privy Council decision in Mohammed v The State, in the hope of 
enhancing judicial technique as judges attempted to circumvent the prima facie 
rule, and allowing the taking into account of society's interest in seeing serious 
offenders being convicted. 
120 R v Ka11 (22 August 2002), CA 179/02. 
121 R v Ka11, above n 120, para 33. 
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However, the balancing test is likely to lead to courts ignoring New Zealand's 
international obligations to provide an effective remedy, and the courts having 
to examine the possibility of providing less than satisfactory alternative 
remedies to those who have had their rights infringed. There is also the very 
real possibility that the rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights will be 
diminished as the majority essentially adopts the common law test towards 
admissibility. Other problems that arise include the fact that ignorance of the 
police officers of the breach may be a factor that weighs towards admissibility, 
and that there may be a tendency to admit real evidence regardless of the fact 
that it may have been conscripted by the police in breach of the Bill of Rights. 
Although the Court did not want a rule based on deterrence, there is no arguing 
that the prima facie rule provided a standard for police conduct. The balancing 
test has brought vagueness to the Jaw and as a result is less likely to act as a 
guide to police when they have to consider the rights of suspects. 
While the pnma facie rule of exclusion may not have been working as 
satisfactorily as intended when it was created, it did uphold the primacy of the 
rights of the individual. The opportunity was neglected in Shaheed to try to 
reform the prima facie rule by enlarging the conditions where the presumption 
of exclusion could have been displaced. If judges were circumventing the rule, 
then their decisions should have been identified and criticised by the Court of 
Appeal. If this would not have altered results then the prima facie rule could 
have been reformed by enlarging the factors that could displace the tendency 
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in favour of exclusion. Instead a balancing approach has been adopted that 
undermines the importance of the Bill of Rights as a protective shield by 
relegating its fundamental rights to factors that will be taken notice of (albeit 
significant notice) in the exercise of judicial discretion. 
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